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The welfare  outcomes  of cutting  a workfare  program-which imposes  work requirements
on welfare  recipients-will  depend  in part on labcir  market  conditions  facing  the participants.
High income  replacement  after retrenchment  might suggest  that unemployment  is not a serious
poverty  problem.  But even when there is high unemployment,  there are other  ways that
retrenched  workers  might recover  the lost income.  Possibly  the work experience  on the program
will help  them find work, including  self-employment.  Or possibly  private transfers  will help
make up for the loss of public support.  Tracking  ex-participants  after  their retrenchment  and
measuring  their income  replacement  may  thus provide  important  clues  to understanding  the true
impact  of a workfare  program.
This paper  tires  to learn about the impact  of a workfare  program  by studying  income
replacement  for those  observed  to leave  the program  after its contraction.  The analytic  problem
we face is the usual one in causal studies  of missing  data on the counter-factual.  It is well
recognized  that "single difference"  comparisons  of income  levels between  participants  and non-
participants  can be highly misleading  given  the existence  of (observable  and unobservable)
heterogeneity  in characteristics  that  jointly influence  participation  and incomes in the absence  of
the program.  Simulations  and comparisons  with actual  experiments  have suggested  that careful
matching  in terms of observable  covariates  can greatly reduce  the bias in observational  studies. 2
Amongst  the various matching  methods  available,  Propensity  Score  Matching  (PSM)  has
attracted  recent  interest given its theoretical  properties,  notably  that exact  matching  by this
2  For  evidence  based  on simulations  see  Rubin  (1979)  and  Rubin  and  Thomas  (2000).  For  evidence
based  on an actual  evaluation  see  Dehejia  and  Wahba  (1999)  who  find  that  single-difference  matching
based  on propensity  scores  gives  a good  approximation  to results  of a randomized  evaluation  of a US
training  program  - much  better  than  the  non-experimental  methods  that  Lalonde  (1986)  assessed  for the
same  program.  However,  Smith  and  Todd  (2000)  question  the  robustness  of Dehejia  and  Wahba's
findings  to model  specification.
2method is the observational equivalent of randomization (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985).
PSM gives unbiased estimates if (inter alia) the conditional independence ("strong ignorability")
assumption holds, whereby pre-intervention outcomes are independent of participation given the
variables used for matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Conditional dependence will leave a
bias, which will depend on the amount of relevant data available for matching.
Another approach in the literature is the popular double difference (DD) estimate,
obtained by comparing treatment and comparison groups in terms of outcome changes over time
relative to a pre-intervention baseline.  DD allows for conditional dependence arising from
additive time-invariant latent heterogeneity.  Since PSM optimally balances observed covariates
between the treatment and comparison groups, it is the obvious method for selecting the
comparison group in double-difference studies. The results of Heckman, Ichimura and Todd
(1997), Heckman et al., (1998), Heckman and Smith (1998) and Smith and Todd (2000) suggest
that a hybrid method, combining PSM for selecting the comparison group with DD to eliminate
time-invariant errors, can greatly reduce (but not eliminate) the bias found in other evaluation
methods, including single-difference matching.
DD estimators have their limitations. In some circumstances it is implausible that the
selection-bias is time invariant. For example, there is a potential bias in DD estimators when the
changes over time are a function of initial conditions that also influence program placement.4
There is also the well-known bias for inferring long-term impacts that can arise when there is a
3  For recent evidence based on simulations see Rubin and Thomas (2000). For evidence based on
actual evaluation see Dehejia and Wahba (1999) who find that single-difference PSM given a good
approximation to results of a randomized evaluation of a US training program - much better than the
non-experimental methods that Lalonde (1986) assessed for the same program. Smith and Todd (2000)
question the robustness of Dehejia and Wahba's findings to model specification.
4  Jalan and Ravallion (1998)  show that this can seriously bias evaluations of poor-area
development programs that are targeted on the basis of initial geographic characteristics that also
influence the growth process.
3pre-program earnings dip (known as "Ashenfelter's dip" following Ashenfelter, 1978). In
assessing short-term impact - a common concern of safety-net interventions -one  would not
normally want to ignore this dip, though it r emains relevant to assessing the time profile of gains
from the safety net.
What if one does not have a pre-intervention baseline?  This is common for safety-net
interventions, such as workfare programs, that have to be set up quickly, in response to a
macroeconomic or agro-climatic crisis.  There is no time to do a baseline survey of (probable)
participants and non-participants. Nor is ranidomization  usually feasible in such settings. Suppose
instead that we follow up samples of participants and non-participants over time, post-
intervention, and that some participants become non-participants. What can we then learn about
the program's impacts?
The approach we propose here is to examine what happens to participants' incomes when
they leave a workfare program, and to compare this with the incomes of continuing participants,
after netting out economy-wide changes, as revealed by a matched comparison group of non-
participants. While this approach is feasible without a baseline survey, it brings its own
problems. Firstly, while differencing over time can eliminate bias due to latent (time-invariant)
matching errors, there remains a potential bias due to any selective retrenchment from the
program based on unobservables. We argue that the direction of bias can be determined under
plausible assumptions.
Secondly, while we are not concerned with any pre-program "Ashenfelter's dip," there
may well be a post-program version of the same phenomenon, namely when earnings drop
sharply at retrenchment, but then recover.  As in the pre-program dip, this need not be a source
of bias in assessing the impact of a safety-net intervention (to the extent that the pre-program dip
4entails a welfare change); nonetheless, the post-program dip is clearly of interest in assessing the
dynamics of recovery from retrenchment. To help address this issue we follow up initial
participants over multiple survey rounds.
We are also interested in seeing whether this type of follow-up study of participants can
identify the gains to current participants from a program - the classic "treatment effect on the
treated" as it is called in the evaluation literature. There are concerns about selection bias, and
there is the problem that past participation may bring current gains to those who leave the
program. Assuming these lagged gains are positive, the net loss from leaving the program will be
less than the gain from participation relative to the counter-factual of never participating. We
derive a test for the joint conditions needed to identify the mean gains to participants from this
type of study, also exploiting further follow-up surveys of past participants.
We study Argentina's Trabajar Program. This government program aims to provide work
to poor unemployed workers on approved sub-projects of direct value to poor communities. The
sub-projects cannot last more than six months, though a worker is not prevented from joining a
new project, if available. In earlier research on the same program, Jalan and Ravallion (1999)
estimated the counter-factual income of current participants if they had not participated using the
mean income of a comparison group of non-participants, obtained by PSM. For the purpose of
the present study, we designed a survey of a random sample of current participants, and returned
to the same households six months later, and then 12 months later. In addition to natural rotation,
there was a very sharp contraction in the program's aggregate outlays after the first survey.
The following section describes the program and the data for its evaluation. Section 3
describes our evaluation method in theoretical terms.  Section 4 presents our results, while some
conclusions can be found in Section 5.
52.  The program and data
In response to a sharp increase in the measured unemployment rate, the Government of
Argentina greatly expanded and redesigned its Trabajar Program in May 1997, with financial and
technical support from the World Bank. The Trabajar Program aims to provide short-term work
at relatively low wages on socially useful projects in poor areas. The projects are proposed by
local (governmental and non-governmental) organizations with priority given to proposals that
are likely to benefit poor areas, according to ex-ante assessments. Workers cannot join the
program unless they aie recruited to an approved project. The projects last a maximum of six
months, but a worker is not prevented from switching to a new project on the same basis.
The wage rate was initially set at a rnaximum of $200 per month, which was cut to $160
in 1999 at the time of an overall contraction in outlays.  (Undercutting of the wage rate is
allowed, but it is uncommon.) The wage rate was chosen to be low enough to assure good
targeting performance, and to help assure workers would take up regular work when it became
available.  By way of comparison, the average monthly earnings for workers in the poorest 10%
of households (ranked by total income per person) in Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) in May 1996
was $263 (calculated from the Permanent Household Survey, discussed further below). (As
expected, the poorest decile also received the lowest average wage, and average wages rose
monotonically with household income per person.)
The data collection for this study began with a survey in May/June 1999 of Trabajar
participants in the main urban areas of three provinces - Chaco (Gran Resistencia), Mendoza
(Gran Mendoza) and Tucuman (Gran Tucaman - Tafi Viejo). These provinces were chosen as
representing the range of labor markets found in Argentina. The families of 1500 randomly
chosen Trabajar workers were interviewed, spread evenly between the three provinces. The
6sampled beneficiary households were a simple random sample from the list of all beneficiaries at
the time. The households of participants were the units for interviewing.
The survey of participants was chosen to coincide with the twice-yearly Permanent
Household Survey (PHS). This is an urban survey focusing on employmnent  and incomes, though
it also includes questions on education and demographics. We calculate individual income from
questions on income from work (wages, bonuses, self-employment income, Trabajar earnings)
and from non-labor sources (pension, rents, dividends, fellowships, food coupons, private
transfers). All provincial capitals or other urban centers with at least 100,000 inhabitants are
included in the PHS.5 The survey is conducted twice a year, around May and October. The PHS
sample size is set to achieve (with 95% confidence) an error of 1% in the unemployment rate
within each urban conglomerate. In large conglomerates, a random sample of geographic units is
chosen, within which a fixed number of households is sampled. In smaller conglomerates, a one-
stage random sample is used. The PHS sample includes 27,000 households.
The PHS is our source of the comparison group for initial participants, to be selected by
propensity-score matching, as described in more detail in the next section. For program
participants, the same interview questionnaire was used as for the PHS, with PHS interviewers.
This avoids the matching bias that can arise when the surveys of participants and non-
participants are not comparable (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Heckman et al., 1998).
Extra questions were added for the survey of Trabajar participants. Moreover, miss-matching can
be reduced by selecting the comparison group separately from each geographic area, to make
sure that the individuals belong to the same local labor markets. 6
5  An exception  is Viedma,  capital  of Rio Negro,  that was replaced  for the urban-rural  conglomerate
of Alto Valle del Rio Negro.
6  Heckman  et al (1998)  find that the mismatch  due to different  questionnaire  and different  labor
markets  amounts  to half of the selection  bias in their analysis.
7A follow-up survey of the same Trabajar participants was done in October/November
1999, to coincide with the next round of the PHS, and similarly in May/June 2000.7 The PHS has
a rotating panel design with one quarter replaced each round, so it was possible to form a panel
for the comparison group. Our matches were constrained to only include those who would be
followed up. Naturally this limits the matching options - particularly so by the second follow-
up survey, by which time only half of the original sample is re-surveyed.
The PHS is a far shorter survey instrument than that used by Jalan and Ravallion (1999)
for their single difference estimate of the impact on incomes of Trabajar participation. Since
there are fewer observables in the data, the matching is unlikely to be as good. Results in the
literature suggest that single-difference PSM estimates can be unreliable when the data available
do not include important determinants of participation (Heckman et al., 1997, 1998; Smith and
Todd, 2000).  However, here we have the advantage that we can follow up participants over
time, exploiting the rotating panel design of the PHS.  Thus, although we cannot expect that our
single difference PSM estimates will be as r eliable as in Jalan and Ravallion, we can eliminate
the time-invariant errors due to miss-matching arising from violations of the conditional
independence assumption.
There was a sharp contraction is Trabajar participation after the first two surveys. 49% of
the Trabajar workers interviewed in the baseline survey were no longer employed under the
program in the first follow-up survey (Table 1). Only 16% of the original Trabajar workers were
employed on the program by the second follow-up survey. This contraction in employment on
the program did not appear to stem from a "pull" effect from the rest of the economy. There was
little sign of economic recovery between the surveys. The overall unemployment rate increased
7  A fourth survey  was done six months  later. Over 90% of the initial  Trabajar  workers  had left the
program  by the fourth wave. There  were too few continuing  participants  to facilitate  further  analysis.
8in one of the provinces (Chaco) and fell, but not greatly, in the other two; see Table 2, which also
gives unemployment rates for the second follow up survey, six months later, and for six months
prior to the first survey.
The large number of participants leaving the program appears instead to be due to a
normal process of rotation arising from the fact that projects do not last longer than six months.
When a project ends, its beneficiaries are not incorporated automatically in another project.  The
responsible organizations are the ones that select the participants.  In the country as a whole,
45% of Trabajar workers participate in only one project (46% in Chaco, 52% in Mendoza and
51% in Tucuman).
On top of this designed rotation, there was a severe contraction in aggregate outlays on
the program starting  at the end of 1999. This was an outcome of overall fiscal austerity, to
keep Argentina within macroeconomic targets. Aggregate spending on the program by the center
in the first five months of 2000 was only 29% of its level in the last five months of 1999.
Existing projects were completed, but the number of new projects approved shrank sharply in the
latter part of 1999, to bring down the center's outlays.  As already noted, the wage rate was also
cut; Table 3 gives the sample mean wages by survey round. The aggregate cuts to the program
made it less likely that past participants would find another project to join. A large new workfare
program, the Emergency Employment program took up some of the slack in 2000. This was not
in operation by the time of the second survey (first follow-up survey), but it was by the third
survey.  While our impact estimates using the first and second surveys are not likely to be
affected by this new program, this is not true of the results using the third survey.
93.  Estimation methods
Our strategy  is to compare  income changes  between  those who stay in the program  and
those  who leave, after  netting out the income changes  for an observationally  similar  comparison
group of non-participants.  This is an examnple  of what has been called in the literature  a
"difference-in-difference-in-difference"  or "triple-difference"  estimate.8 We first discuss  our
method  of selecting  comparison  groups,  both of initial participants  and for continuing
participants.  We then describe  our version of the triple-difference  estimator.
3.1  Controllingfor  observed heterogeneity
We use PSM  to balance  observed  covariates  at two stages.  Firstly  we form a matched
comparison  group for initial participants  and secondly  we match those  who continue  to
participate  over time ("stayers")  with those that drop out ("leavers").  The second  stage matching
deals with the observed  differences  between  subsequent  leavers  and stayers.
PSM balances  the distributions  of covariates  between  participants  and a comparison
group  based on similarity  of their predicted  probabilities  of participation  (their "propensity
scores").  Rosenbaum  and Rubin (1983)  show  that exact matching  on the basis of propensity
scores  eliminates  the bias in identifying  the causal effect  due to covariates.  PSM is thus the
observational  analog  of an experiment  in which  participation  is independent  of outcomes;  the
difference  is that a pure experiment  does not  require  the untestable  assumption  of independence
conditional  on observables.
8  The  triple-difference  method  appears  to have  been  first  used  by  Gruber  (1994)  who  included
interaction  effects  between  time  and  location  (as well  as separate  time  and  location  effects)  in modeling
the earnings  effects  of labor  laws  in the  US.
10Two groups are identified: those that participate (Di =1) and those that do not (D,=0). We
rule out interference between units under the assumption that the gain to a worker from
participation in a program such as Trabajar does not spillover to nonparticipants. 9 Participants
are matched to individuals who did not participate on the basis of the propensity score, defined
as P(x,)  = Pr(D,  = 1lx 1) where xi is a vector of pre-exposure control variables. Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) prove that if the Di's are independent over all i, and outcomes are independent of
participation given xi (i.e. unobserved differences do not influence whether or not i participates),
then outcomes are also independent of participation given P(x 1), just as they would be if
participation was assigned randomly.'0 The value of P(x) is used to select control subjects for
each of those treated. This eliminates bias in estimated treatment effects due to differences in the
covariates.
In practice the propensity score must be estimated. Here we follow the standard practice
in PSM applications of using the predicted values from standard logit models to estimate the
propensity score for each observation in the participant and the comparison-group samples.
Using the estimated propensity score, matched-pairs are constructed on the basis of how close
the scores  are across the two samples. The nearest neighbor to the i'th participant is defined as
the non-participant that minimizes [P(x,) - P(xj )]2  over allj  in the set of non-participants,
where  P(Xk)  is the predicted propensity score for observation k. Matches are only accepted if
[P(xi) - P(x1)V  is less than 0.00001 (an absolute difference less than 0.0032.)  We only include
those observations on non-participants that share a common range of values of the propensity
9  In the matching  literature,  this is the stable  unit-treatment  value  assumption  (Rosenbaum  and
Rubin, 1983).
10  The assumption  that outcomes  are independent  of participation  given  xi is variously  referred  to in
the literature  as the "conditional  independence,"  "strong  ignorability,"  or "selection  on observables."
11scores calculated for the participants (i.e., the two groups share common support in the predicted
propensity scores).  In the following analysis, the comparison group for each participant is
defined as the set of five nearest neighbors amongst non-participants in terms of the predicted
propensity scores.
3.2  Latent heterogeneity
PSM gives unbiased estimates of program impact if selection into the program is based
solely on observables; selection bias due to (non-ignorable) latent heterogeneity will remain in
single difference comparisons using PSM. With access to a pre-intervention baseline, one can
eliminate time-invariant selection bias due to unobservables, by differencing over time. One can
also deal with time-invariant selection bias with only post-intervention data, using follow-up
surveys. However, in doing so one must recognize that the gains to current non-participants need
not be symmetric before and after participation; while one may be happy to assume that baseline
units are unaffected by the program, it is far less plausible that drop outs gain nothing currently
from their past participation. So there are two distinct sources of selection bias in our set-up. One
is in the existence of latent heterogeneity in who participates in the program, leading to miss-
matching in determining the comparison group, and hence a systematic error in measuring the
counter-factual income. Secondly, latent heterogeneity may affect the decision to stay in the
program or drop out.  Participants with high (unobserved) gains from participation may well be
less likely to drop out of the program. This source of bias does not disappear.
The double difference ("difference-in-difference" or DD) estimate is the difference in the
income gains over time between a treatment group of program participants and a matched
comparison group of non-participants.  Our triple difference estimate (DDD)  is defined as the
difference between the value of the double difference for stayers and leavers.
12Without loss of generality we can write the observed income of a Trabajar participant at
date t as:
yi,t=it+i  (t21  1
where Yj, is the counter-factual income of the Trabajar participant if the program had not
existed, and G 1,  is the income gain from participation (either participation at that date or
previously).
An indicator of the counter-factual income is available for a matched comparison group
and is given by Yc.  This is a noisy indicator due to miss-matching arising from latent
heterogeneity. Thus the single difference estimator is potentially biased. We make the standard
assumption in double-difference studies that the selection bias is time invariant, and so it is swept
away by taking differences over time. More precisely, the first difference of Y~, is assumed to
provide an unbiased estimate of the first difference of Yt,:
E(AY,c) = AY,*  (2)
where A refers to the difference between the value at t and t- 1. From (1) and (2) it is evident
that:
E[A(Yj,  - Yc,)] = AGi,  (3)
In the usual double difference set up, period 1 precedes the intervention, and it is
assumed that Gil = 0 for all i. However, in our case, the program is in operation in period 1. The
scope for identification arises from the fact that some participants at date 1 drop out of the
program at date 2.  Let Di, = 1 if individual i stays in the program, and let Di, = 0 if she does
not. Our triple-difference estimator for t-2  is then:
13DDD  E-  [A(Y,T - Yc  )ID2  =  1]  - E[A(YiT  - yc )ID, 2 =0=
[E(GC 2IDi 2 = 1)  - E(Gi2 IDi 2 =  0)] - [E(G 1ID, 2 = 1)  - E(Gj,  IDi 2 =  0)]  (4)
The first term in square brackets on the far RHS of (4) is the net gain to continued participation
in the program, given by the difference between the gain to participants in period 2 and the gain
to those who dropped out. This provides our measure of income replacement. Notice that there
may be some gain from past participation for those who drop out (E(G,2 ID, 2 =  0)  ￿  0).  For
example, current participants may learn a skill that raises future income.  Even so,
E(GO 2 IDi 2 = 1)  - E(Gi 2 IDj 2 =  0)  gives the income loss to those who leave the program, allowing
for the possibility that leavers may benefit from past participation.
The second term on the RHS of (4) is the selection bias arising from any effect of the
gains at date 1 on participation at date 2.  Under the conditional independence assumption of
PSM, this term equals zero and DDD then gives the mean net gain to stayers in the program.  It
is readily verified from (4) that DDD gives the current gain to participants (E(G,2ID, 2= 1)) if (in
addition) there are no current gains to non-participants i.e., one can set E(G, 2IDi 2 =  0).
Unlike our matching of non-participants in the first survey (to form the comparison
group), we cannot relax the conditional independence assumption in drawing inferences from our
matching of stayers with leavers. The most plausible way in which this assumption would not
hold is that leavers tend to be those with lower gains in the first period. Then
E(Gi, IDi 2 = 1) > E(G,j )D, 2 = 0) and so our DDD estimator based on (4) will underestimate the
net gain to continued participation in the program.
Notice also that if there is no latent heterogeneity then we can estimate mean gains using
only the single difference, by comparing mean income of participants with that of the matched
14control group; this is the estimator used by Jalan and Ravallion (1999).  Similarly, to obtain
E(Gj2 jD,2 = 1) one would simply take the difference in mean incomes of those who stayed in the
program and the comparison group, and to obtain E(G, 2ID, 2=  0) one would make the same
calculation for leavers.  By comparing the two estimates of E(G, 2 IDi 2 =  1)  -E(Gi 2IDi 2= 0) we
determine how much bias there is in the matching estimator due to unobserved heterogeneity.
So far we have focused on t=2.  A third round allows a joint test of the conditions
required for interpreting DDD as an estimate of the gains to current participants in period 2.
Recall that those conditions are that  E(G, 2 IDi 2=  0) (no current gain to ex-participants) and that
E(G2 1ID, 2 =  1) =  E(G, 1 JDA 2 =  0)  (no selection bias in terms of who leaves the program).  Suppose
one decomposes the aggregate estimate of DDD according to whether or not a person leaves the
program in the third survey round. If there is no selection bias then this decomposition gives:
DDD  = [E(Gi 2 IDi 2 = 1,  DO 3 =  1)  - E(Gi 2 Di 2 =  0,  DO 3 = 1)]  Pr(D,3 =  1)  +
(5)
[E(Gi2 IDi 2 = 1, Di3 = 0) - E(Gi2 ID, 2 = 0, Di3 =  0)] Pr(D,3 = 0)
If in addition there are no current gains to non-participants then this simplifies further to:
DDD = E(G,2ID, 2 = 1,D,3 = 1)Pr(D, 3 =  1)  + E(Gi2jD, 2 = 1,D, 3 =  O)Pr(D,3 =  0)  (6)
However, in the absence of selection bias the two terms in this decomposition will be equal, i.e.,
DDD = E(Gi2 lDi2 = I,D83 = 1) = E(G,2 ID,2 = 1,Di3 =  0)  (7)
We will test this implication.  If it holds in the data then we can interpret DDD as the gain to
current participants (the "mean effect of the treatment on the treated"). If it fails then either or
both of the two conditions above fail, though we do not know which it is.
154.  Results
Recall that there are two matches  that need  to be done, one for selecting  the comparison
group of non-participants  in the first survey  and one for balancing  observed  covariates  between
subsequent  leavers  and stayers.  Table  4 gives  the logit regressions  used in constructing  the
propensity  scores  for these two stages  of matching. In modeling  whether  an initial participant
drops out in the second round we can make use of a richer set of questions  available  only for the
Trajabar  sample.  Extra questions  on participation  in neighborhood  associations  and indicators  of
whether  the selection  into the program  was due to  personal  contacts  (with  various actors)  allow
us to measure  the importance  of social networks  to program  participation,  found to be important
in Jalan and Ravallion  (1999).  Moreover,  we have information  on the workers' labor force
histories (prior  to joining Trabajar).  The evaluation  literature  has recently  emphasized  changes  in
labor force status  as an important  determinant  of participation  in training  programs.'I
In the second-stage  matching  we find that the additional  variables  for the Trabajar  sample
are  jointly significant  in explaining  who (Irops  out of the program.  However,  the first logit
regression  (used to determine  the comparison  group of non-participants  from the national
sample)  still has far higher predictive  ability  than  the second-stage  logit, as indicated  by the
pseudo R 2. The lack of observable  correlates  of which individuals  dropped  out adds weight to
the a  priori arguments  in section  2 that this was not due to "pull" factors,  which  one would
expect  to be correlated  with observables  (such as education). The significant  determinants  of
program  participation  in the first regression  seem  plausible.
I  I  See for example  Dehejia  and Wahba  (1998, 1999),  Heckman  and Smith  (1998),  Heckman,
Lalonde  and Smith  (1999).
16Of the original sample of 1459 Trabajar participants, we restrict the sample to those
workers aged 15-65. 264 observations had to be dropped because satisfactory matches were not
available in the PHS for both survey rounds, or key data were missing.'2 The 1195 Trabajar
participants were then matched with 1868 distinct individuals in the PHS (allowing up to five
matches, and with replacement).  After forming the panel across the two surveys, we ended up
with a sample of 1018 Trabajar participants who could be matched satisfactorily and followed up
in the second round. Figure 1 gives the distribution of the log of the odds ratios for Trabajar
samples and the PHS samples by province. The vertical lines give the regions of common
support. Note that we are mainly losing observations from the PHS sample with low probabilities
of participating in Trabajar.
In the second survey, 520 of the Trabajar participants from the first round dropped out of
the program. After matching on the basis of the propensity scores based on Table 4 (column 2),
we had 419 stayers matched with 400 leavers.
Table 5 gives the calculations of DDD. Our estimate of the income gain to stayers from
participation in the program, net of the income gain attributed to past participation, is $140 per
month, about three quarters of the gross wage. Table 6 repeats the calculations of Table 5, but
this time no matching is done in the second survey. The results are very similar, consistent with
our expectation that the bulk of the people dropping out of the program were doing so
involuntarily. For if withdrawal from the program had been voluntary then we would expect it to
be correlated with observed correlates and (hence) that the second-stage matching would make a
difference to our results.
12  36 were outside  the region  of common  support, 137  did not satisfy  the maximum  absolute
difference  in propensity  scores of 0.00001,  and 64 did not have  at least one match in both survey  rounds.
17It is notable how poorly the single difference estimator performs in the first survey, with
no significant positive impact indicated (Tables 5 and 6). There is clearly a large bias due to
latent heterogeneity in the single difference estimator in our data. However, the single difference
estimator comparing stayers and leavers in the second round does better; indeed, it gets closer to
the DDD estimate than the double difference estimate for program leavers.
In Table 7 we give a breakdown of the results by province. The results  suggest that the
losses from retrenchment are smaller for areas with less tight local labor markets: our estimate of
DDD is lowest for Mendoza, where the unemployment rate is also lowest (Table 2).
Table 8 gives the analogous results to Table 6, at household level. The "bottom line" is
that we find no sign of a spillover effect on the earnings or non-labor incomes of other household
members.  Measured impacts are confined to the incomes of Trabajar workers. (Of course there
are sure to be consumption gains to others within the household, via some degree of pooling.)
Table 9 gives the results when we look at income replacement over 12 months. Naturally
we cannot do this over the same samples as before, and (in particular) the sample of continuous
stayers is greatly reduced.  The third survey round does indicate a sizable recovery of income for
leavers from the second round; the treatmient  group's mean income dips from $228 per month in
the first survey to $86 in the second, but rebounds to $138 in the third (Table 9). This possibly
reflects in part income gains from the new Emergency Employment Program introduced in
2000.13  However, there is also evidence of a rise in private employment. Amongst those who left
the program in round 2, 49% had found jobs in that round, and the work was deemed to be
"permanent employment" in 34% of cases; by round 3, the proportion employed had risen to
13  The special Trabajar module has a question on whether individuals participated in another
temporary program (other than Trabajar); 50%o  of the Trabajar sample report doing so in the third survey,
as opposed to 2% in the second survey.
1858% and 59% were permanent jobs. The DDD estimate for round three indicates that about half
of the second round loss is recovered.  On aggregating over the two rounds, the net income gain
to stayers is $73 per month (=130-58), representing slightly less than one half of the mean gross
wage in round 3 (Table 2a).
What can we conclude about net income gains from the program?  Recall that our DDD
estimator also gives the net gain to current participation if there is no selection bias and no
current gains to non-participants who had previously participated (section 3).  Given that there
was a large contraction imposed on the program, selection bias might not be considered an
important concern (section 2).  What about lagged effects?  One source of evidence can be found
in qualitative questions added to the third round of the survey, on whether current or past
Trabajar participants felt that the program had improved their earning opportunities outside the
program. Table 10 summarizes the results.  A high proportion of respondents felt that the
program improved their chances of getting ajob;  roughly half felt that it gave them a marketable
skill; about one quarter felt that it expanded their contacts. These results are suggestive of
income gains from the program to ex-participants. However, there are two caveats. The expected
gains may take some time to materialize, depending on the aggregate labor market conditions.
Secondly, there may well be biases in answering qualitative questions of this sort. Cognitive
dissonance may lead participants to prefer to believe that there will be future gains beyond their
current participation in the program.
Table 11 gives our results in testing the joint hypothesis of no current gains from past
participation and no selection bias (equation (7)). Under the null, the gains from participating in
the program in period 2 should not depend on participation in period 3. We are not able to reject
19the null hypothesis (p-value 0.47).  This provides a justification for interpreting DDD as the
mean gain to current participants.
It is of interest to compare our results with those of Jalan and Ravallion (1999). The latter
paper used single-difference matching on a richer data set. Their estimated mean net gain to
Trabajar participation was $103 per month, rising to $157 using nearest-neighbor matching. Our
single-difference estimate gives an implausible results that deviates greatly from Jalan and
Ravallion. This is not true of our DDD estimate in Table 5 of $140. Aggregating over the three
rounds, our estimated income gain to participants of $73 is less than Jalan and Ravallion
obtained.'4 But this is what we would expect as long as participants are able in time to recover a
greater amount of the income lost from retrenchment than initially observed.
From the point of view of evaluation design, our results suggest a trade off between the
resources devoted to cross-sectional data collection for the purpose of single-difference
matching, versus collecting longitudinal data with a lighter survey instrument. The lighter
instrument we have used here was not able to deliver plausible single-difference estimates using
PSM, when compared to prior estimates using richer data for the same program. However, it
would appear that we have been able to satisfactorily address this problem by tracking
households over time, even using the lighter instrument.
5.  Conclusions
To see what happens to workfare participants after they leave the program, we have
matched a random sample of participants in Argentina's Trabajar Program with a group of non-
14  The estimated  forgone  income  of participants  as a proportion  of the gross  wage is higher than
Datt and Ravallion's  (1994)  estimate  for a workfare  program  in India,  though the latter  setting  was
arguably  one in which unemployment  was higher.
20participants drawn from a strictly comparable national survey. We then followed both samples
over time, during a period of aggregate program contraction on top of designed rotation of
program beneficiaries. We have used propensity score matching methods to balance observed
covariates at two stages: between initial participants and the comparison group, and between
those who left the program and those who stayed. Since we track outcomes over time, we can
eliminate any time-invariant selection bias in the first matching.  Selection bias remains in the
second stage matching, though we can sign the bias under plausible assumptions.  The fact that
there was a large centrally-imposed contraction in program outlays as well as designed rotation
helps reduce concerns about selection bias at the second-stage matching.
We find that the estimated income losses to those who left the program were sizable,
representing about three-quarters of the gross wage within the first six months, though falling to
slightly less than half over 12 months, indicating existence of a post-program version of
"Ashenfelter's dip". Fully removing selection bias would probably yield even lower estimates of
income replacement.
Interpreting our triple-difference estimate as a measure of the gains from the program
requires two conditions: that there is no selection bias in leaving the program, and that there are
no lagged income effects from past participation.  On a priori grounds we find the selection bias
argument implausible in this setting. On the other hand, the existence of lagged income effects is
supported by qualitative questions in the survey. We have proposed a joint test of these
conditions, based on comparing the triple difference estimate for those who left versus stayed in
a third round of the survey. Statistically, we cannot reject the conditions required for using our
triple-difference measure as an estimate of the gains to current participants. We conclude that the
program generated sizable net income gains to participants.
21While our results point to losses from retrenchment, one should be cautious in drawing
conclusions for other settings. A key factor is likely to be the level of unemployment (notably
amongst the poor) at the time the program is cut. If one cuts disbursements at a time of
sufficiently rapid economic recovery, or in regions where recovery is underway, then the loss to
workers is likely to be smaller than we have found.
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24Table 1: Trabajar participation rates across survey rounds
May 1999  October 1999  May 2000
(baseline  (first follow-  (second follow-
survey)  up survey)  up survey)
Total interviewed  1459  1332  1291
Participants  1459  632  212
(% of total interviewed)  (100%)  (47.4%)  (16%)
Chaco  504  149  (34%)  17 (4%)
Mendoza  474  285 (63%)  146  (32%)
Tucuman  481  198  (44%)  49 (11%)
% non-participant  who are  49.0%  60.5%
employed
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from  the Trabajar  sample.
Table 2: Unemployment  rates in the selected provinces and nationally
% of the labor force  October 1998  May 1999  October  1999  May 2000
unemployed  (baseline  (first follow-  (second  follow-
(urban areas)  survey)  up survey)  up survey)
Chaco  11.3  9.5  12.4  10.4
Mendoza  5.7  7.6  6.8  9.8
Tucuman  14.9  19.2  15.9  19.9
All urban areas  12.4  14.5  13.8  15.4
Source:  Trabajar  Project  Office,  Ministry  of Labor.
Table 3: Average wage rate for Trabajar projects in the selected provinces
Wage  rate ($ per month)  May 1999  October 1999  May 2000
(baseline  (first follow-  (second follow-
survey)  up survey)  up survey)
Chaco  194.9  183.8  165.5
Mendoza  200.0  192.8  168.9
Tucuman  195.9  195.4  165.5
Source:  Trabajar  Project  Office,  Ministry  of Labor.
25Table  4: Logit regressions  for program  participation
Chaco  Mendoza  Tucuman
Propensity  score Dropout  2nd  Propensity  score Dropout  2nd  Propensity  score Dropout  2nd
Ist wave  wave  Ist wave  wave  Ist wave  wave
Coeff  Std  error  Coeff  Std  error  Coeff  Std  error  Coeff  Std  error  Coeff  Std  error  Coeff  Std  error
Common variables
age  25_29  0.205  0.20  -0.444  0.38  0.024  0.23  0.285  0.41  0.584  0.21**  -0.410  0.42
age  30_39  -0.571  0.23**  -0.277  0.44  -0.638  0.24**  -0.427  0.48  -0.080  0.24  0.000  0.48
age  40_49  -1.117  0.28**  0.815  0.63  -0.649  0.27**  0.904  0.53*  0.220  0.26  0.134  0.57
age 50_54  -1.089  0.32**  0.577  0.60  -1.165  0.29**  0.502  0.56  -0.265  0.29  1.071  0.69
male  1.687  0.20**  -0.745  0.48  1.329  0.17**  0.832  0.50*  0.838  0.18**  0.553  0.42
head  of the household  -0.089  0.27  0.079  0.51  0.373  0.29  -0.124  0.49  -0.229  0.28  -0.463  0.54
spouse  of the head  -0.438  0.36  -1.405  0.76*  -0.170  0.36  0.807  0.99  -0.438  0.34  0.068  0.80
married  0.352  0.22  0.290  0.38  -0.277  0.23  -0.112  0.41  -0.256  0.22  0.057  0.43
PS not completed  -0.524  0.30*  0.735  0.70  1.000  0.28**  0.263  0.77  0.024  0.26  0.393  0.62
PS completed  -0.537  0.27**  0.526  0.65  0.741  0.25**  1.005  0.71  -0.238  0.22  0.507  0.51
SS not completed  -1.158  0.27**  0.505  0.61  -0.232  0.26  0.928  0.68  -0.795  0.22**  1.012  0.48**
SS completed  -0.955  0.30**  0.590  0.69  -0.636  0.31**  1.080  0.80  -0.677  0.28**  0.720  0.62
house  is a villa  -0.322  0.26  -2.310  0.81**  0.468  0.28*  -1.658  1.36  0.442  0.38  0.183  1.18
house  is an apt.  -0.765  0.44*  -0.088  0.60  -0.535  0.23**  0.288  0.46  0.420  0.21**  0.592  0.48
1  room  1.717  0.30**  2.187  0.32**  0.046  0.70  1.570  0.34**  -1.347  0.70*
2 rooms  1.141  0.25**  0.532  0.52  1.657  0.29**  -0.389  0.60  1.634  0.26**  -0.465  0.60
3 rooms  0.315  0.22  0.381  0.45  1.137  0.28**  0.029  0.57  0.932  0.24**  -0.627  0.57
4rooms  0.270  0.23  0.578  0.48  0.714  0.29**  0.110  0.61  0.337  0.26  0.174  0.56
bathroom  in the hh  -0.170  0.26  0.110  0.70  1.115  0.28**  1.408  0.61**  1.285  0.31**  -0.262  0.62
own  only land  -0.407  0.20**  -0.244  0.33  0.675  0.28**  0.077  1.17  -1.810  0.26**  0.084  0.50
renting  -1.415  0.28**  0.351  1.11  -1.089  0.24**  -0.723  0.55  -1.001  0.61
walls- deMamposteria  -1.183  0.32**  -2.043  1.16*  0.350  0.18*  -0.545  0.43  -1.891  0.19**  -0.563  0.44
fraction  non-migrants  1.390  0.24**  1.289  0.55**  -0.163  0.22  -0.087  0.51  0.465  0.25*  -1.472  0.66**
extended  family  0.411  0.18**  -0.375  0.37  0.305  0.18*  -0.158  0.36  -0.060  0.19  0.082  0.44
fraction  children  6-12  -1.685  0.40**  0.143  1.02  -0.807  0.46**  0.535  0.97  0.632  0.43  -0.365  0.98
attending  school
26
020-8221H32ss.pw  9/10/01  3:52:05  PM  magenta  Black
Lavout:  Harris  32  SS  Form  1 of  2  - backfraction children 13-18  -0.330  0.18*  0.222  0.36  -0.227  0.19  -0.239  0.35  -0.423  0.18**  0.000  0.40
attending school
fraction members 0-5  5.579  1.12**  0.490  1.73  -1.687  0.87*  0.760  1.97  -6.302  0.99**  2.318  1.86
fraction members 6-14  -3.019  1.13**  -1.849  1.85  -0.975  0.95  0.569  2.18  -6.662  0.99**  2.110  1.96
fraction members 15-64  -3.878  1.01"*  -0.748  1.47  -1.850  0.78**  0.387  1.70  -5.194  0.88**  1.420  1.61
household size  0.166  0.04**  -0.018  0.08  0.032  0.04  -0.100  0.08  0.113  0.04**  -0.091  0.08
constant  2.314  1.14**  2.567  2.08  -2.750  0.91*  -3.536  2.08  3.020  0.96  1.298  1.97
Extra variables  for Trabaiar  participants
participated to neighborhood  -0.714  0.46  -0.686  0.40*  -0.245  0.43
associations
entered in Trabajar due to personal contacts w/:
- municipality officials  -0.939  0.48**  -0.006  0.34  1.298  0.62**
-union leaders  0.059  0.47  0.692  0.39*  -0.327  0.42
-former Trabajar  -0.800  0.46*  -0.502  0.45  -1.055  0.51**
workers
-dirigentes  0.154  0.41  0.280  0.38  -1.047  0.47**
barriales/others
previously employed as:
-temporary worker  0.391  0.38  0.849  0.49*  -0.254  0.44
- permanent worker  -0.448  0.36  0.440  0.52  -0.504  0.48
Number  of obs  2023  359  2615  352  1827  302
log  likelihood  -824.8  -197.0  -952.1  -197.6  -795.8  -175.4
pseudo  R2  0.268  0.155  0.221  0.128  0.238  0.157
F-test  joint significance  basic  0.064  0.284  0.253
specification  (p-value)
F-test  joint significance  new  0.008  0.044  0.002
variables  (p-value)  _  _
Note: (1) Ist stage matching of participants with non-participants using Trabajar and PHS samples; (2) 2nd stage matching of leavers and stayers
using Trabajar sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.Table 5: Triple-difference estimates of income replacement
Stayers  in round  2  Matched  leavers  in round 2
(Di2  =1)  (D, 2 =0)
N=419  N=400
Trabajar  Matched  non-  Single  Trabajar  Matched  non-  Single
Participants  participants  Difference  Participants  participants  difference
in round 1  round  1  in round 1  round 1
(Di,  = 1)  (Di, =°0)  (Di,  =1)  (Di, =  0)
y  T  y-C  yT  -C
yt=  Yt  Yt=  Yt
t=1  228.9  282.7  -53.8  223.6  294.4  -70.8
(3.8)  (13.2)  (14.0)  (2.9)  (12.6)  (12.9)
t=2  228.4  277.3  -48.8  83.0  288.8  -205.8
(4.1)  (13.3)  (13.9)  (6.2)  (12.0)  (13.9)
Single  Ty~  - T  -yC
difference  AyT  AY  AYC=
-0.5  -5.4  -140.7  -5.6
(4.5)  (7.4)  (6.2)  (8.1)
difference  [A(Y2 - Y'2 )Di2 2 =  1] =  [A(Y2  =  0] =
4.9  -135.1
(8.3)  (10.6)
Triple  [A(YT  -13-ATY  Y01°
difference  Y2  )tD 2 )1D, =  01D
140.0
(13.4)
Note: Standard  errors in parentheses.Table 6: Triple-difference estimates of income replacement with only first-stage matching
Stayers  in round 2 (DO 2 =  1)  Leavers in round 2 (Di2 =  0)
N=498  N =520
Participants Matched  non-  Single  Participants Matched  non-  Single
in round 1  participants  Difference  in round I  participants  difference
(Di, =I)  round I  (Dl  =  1)  round I
(D,I = O)  (D11=  O)
-TT  - c  TT=  - c
t=1  228.1  286.7  -58.4  225.4  286.1  -60.6
(3.4)  (12.4)  (13.0)  (2.9)  (10.6)  (10.9)
t-2  228.2  278.4  -50.2  83.4  281.6  -198.2
(3.7)  (12.0)  (12.5)  (5.6)  (9.9)  (11.8)
Single  yT  -C  T  -C
difference  AYt  t  =Yt  t
0.10  -8.2  -142.0  -4.4
(4.7)  (7.2)  (5.5)  (6.8)
difference  [A(Y2 - Y2 )|D, 2 = 1]  =  [A(Y2  - Y2  )(D, 2 = 0]
8.3  -137.6
(7.9)  (9.1)




Note:  Standard  errors  in parentheses.'Table 7: Disaggregation  by province
Stayers in round 2 (Di 2 =  1)  Leavers in round 2 (Di2 =  0)
Participants  Matched  non-  Participants  Matched  non-
in round 1  participants  in round I  participants
(D,, =1)  round  I  (Dil  `=1)  round  I
(Dji,=  )  (Djil'  =O)
Chaco  N=128  N=233
Single difference  -T  -C  -T  C
AY 1 =  tY,=  AY,=  tY,=
-26.7  -12.6  -167.6  -3.8
(8.2)  (7.2)  (6.3)  (6.8)
Double  difference  [A(  Y)D=T1]=  [  _T  -C)D,=  0]  =
-14.1  -171.5
(11.1)  (10.6)
Triple  difference  [A(YT  _Y)D 2 =1]-  [A(Y2-YT  )|D2 =
157.5
(16.6)
Mendoza  N=231  N=122
Single  difference  -yT  - -c  -yT  -yC
AY-  AYt=  AYt  tY
7.4  -8.7  -112.5  -27.2
(5.9)  (13.2)  (14.7)  (20.2)
Double  difference [A(YT -Y2)ID, 2 =1]  [A(Y2 -Y2)ID,  0]=
16.1  -85.2
(14.1)  (10.6)
Triple  difference  [A(yT  _  )fD2 =1]  -[A(Y2  -TY)JD 2 =0]=
101.3
(27.0)
Tucuman  N=139  N=165
Single  difference  -T  -c  -T  -C
AYt=  TY  I  AYt  AYt=
12.7  -3.4  -127.6  -0.8
(6.7)  (10.8)  (9.8)  (10.0)
Double  difference  [A(Y2 -Y2)jDj 2 =1]=  [A(Y2 -Y2)jD,  =0]
16.1  -128.4
(12.8)  (14.4)
Triple difference  [A(Y  -YT  )jD2 =1]-[A(Y2-Y2)fD 2 =
144.5
(19.6)Table  8: Household  income  effects
Stayers in round 2 (Di2 =  1)  Leavers in round 2 (DO 2 =  0)
N=498  N=520
Participants  Matched non-  Single  Participants  Matched non-  Single
in round 1  participants  difference  in round 1  participants  difference
(Di,  =1)  round I  (DJl = 1 )  round I
(Dl  = 0)  (Di,  = 0)
-T  -c  -T=T  yC
t=l  Total hh income  537.2  706.4  -169.2  536.4  691.8  -155.4
(15.8)  (11.0)  (23.6)  (16.8)  (18.4)  (23.9)
Trabajar workers' income  261.0  257.5
(5.6)  (5.7)
Earnings other members  236.1  630.8  233.6  602.3
(13.7)  (13.7)  (17.3)  (15.2)  (15.7)
Other income  40.1  75.6  -35.5  45.3  89.5  -44.2
(6.2)  (6.7  (8.8  (5.7)  (7.5)  (9.5)
t=2  Total hh income  507.3  689.6  -182.3  354.2  670.2  -315.9
(18.4)  (13.3)  (22.8)  (14.9)  (17.0)  (22.9)
Trabajar workers' income  232.5  83.5
(4.0)  (5.6)
Earnings other members  232.9  614.4  225.3  583.7
(13.3)  (16.5)  (13.1)  (15.5)
Other income  41.9  75.2  -33.3  43.7  86.4  -42.7
(6.3)  (5.4)  (8.4)  (4.9)  (5.3)  (7.1)
Single difference  T=  7YC  =  T=  2=
Total hh income  -29.8  -16.8  -182.2  -21.5
(11.4)  (12.3)  (14.6)  (12.6)
Trabajar workers' income  -28.5  -172.4
(5.7)  (7.5)
Earnings other members  -3.2  -16.4  -8.2  -18.5
(9.6)  (11.0)  (11.5)  (10.9)
Other income  1.8  -0.3  -1.6  -3.1
(3.8)  (5.1)  (4.9)  (6.2)
Double difference  [A(Y2  -TY2)D 2 =11=  [A(YT  -Y  )ID 2 =0] =
Total hh income  -13.1  -160.5
(16.2)  (19.7)
Trabajar workers' income  -28.5  -172.4
(5.7)  (7.5)
Earnings other members  13.2  10.3
(14.0)  (16.2)
Other income  2.2  1.5
(6.2)  (8.0)
Triple difference  [A(Y2-  2 )ID2  = 1]-T[A(Y2-Y2  )I2 = 0]=
Total hh income  147.4  (25.6)
Trabajar workers' income  144.8  (9.5)
Earnings other members  2.9 (21.5)
Other income  1.8 (5.1)Table 9: Triple-difference estimates of income replacement over 12 months (two follow-up rounds)
Stayers in rounds 2 and 3  Leavers in rounds 2 and 3
(Di 2 =1;Di3  =)  (D 2 =O;Di 3 =0)
N=I 18  N=424
Treatment  Comparison  Single  Treatment  Comparison  Single
difference  difference
-T  -C-T  -C yT=  yC=  yt  yC=
T=1  228.0  285.7  -57.7  227.5  272.2  -44.6
(8.1)  (27.9)  (29.6)  (3.4)  (13.7)  (13.8)
T=2  241.3  314.9  -73.7  85.5  276.4  -190.9
(8.4)  (32.9)  (33.0)  (6.2)  (12.3)  (14.1)
T=3  219.5  289.0  -69.5  138.4  267.3  -128.9
(6.8)  (25.3)  (25.8)  (7.0)  (18.6)  (14.5)
Single  T-c  -T  -C differenge  hy2=  AY 2=  AY2 =  AY2=
difference  13.3  29.3  -142.0  4.2
(9.2)  (20.8)  (6.2)  (9.3)
7y_
T -C  -T  yC
AY3  AY3 =  AY3=3 
-21.7  -25.9  52.9  -9.0
(9.  1)  (18.0)  (7.4)  (16.5)
Double  -T  _-C  -A(  -T
difference  [A(2  -Y2 2  Y 2 1,  D 1=11=  Y2 -Y 2 )ID 1 2 =  O,D 3 =0o=
-16.0  -146.3
(22.0)  (I 1.9)
[A(Y3  - Yc )fD, 2 = 1,  D8 3 = 1] =  [A(Yi  - Y3 )ID,2 = 0, D 13 = 0] =
4.2  62.0
(20.0)  (16.5)
Cumulative gain  -11.8  -84.3
(22.4)  (15.7)
difference  [A(Y2 -Y2)jD 2 =1,D3 =1]-[A(Y2  -Yc2)D2 =0,D3 =0]=
130.3
(25.3)
[A(Y3 - Y3 )jD 2 = 1,  D3 =1]-[A(Y3  - Y3 )ID 2 = 0, D3 = 0] =
-57.8
(33.1)
Cumulative gain  72.5
(32.0)
Note: Standard  errors  in parentheses;  both  matched  comparison  groups  and matched  leavers  (as in Table  3).Table 10: Perceived gains from past participation from the program
Length of exposure to  One round  Two rounds  Three rounds
the program:
Di2 =l;Di 2 = 0;DO 3 = 0  DA 2 =1;D 2 =l;Di 3 =0  Dj2 =l;Di 2 =l;Di 3 =1
N=962  N =464 (48.2%)  N=  339 (35.2%)  N=  136 (14.1%)
% of respondents replying "yes"
Expanded job opportunities:
Expected  gains in  t-2  35.7  52.6  51.2
Expected  gains  in t3  all  33.7  37.9  48.7
Employed  in t=3  35.4  42.7
Unemployed  in t=3  31.1  31.1
Learned skills for other jobs:
Expected  gains in t=2  51.8  66.1  64.7
Expected  gains in  t=3 all  45.0  53.5  61.5
Employed  in t3  38.6  51.0  70.0
Unemployed  in t=3  55.0  57.1
Expanded contacts for future:
Expected  gains  in t2  25.7  35.9  40.0
Expected  gains in t=3 all  21.9  22.9  32.6
Employed  in t=3  24.5  22.6  30.0
Unemployed  in t=3  17.8  23.3
Note: Sample  of Trabajar  workers  - special  module  in period  3Table 11: Joint test of no lagged gains from past participation and no selection bias: Triple-
difference estimates of income replacement over 6 months
Stayers round 3 (Dj3 =1)
Participants  round 2 (Di2 =  1)  Non-participants round 2 (Di2 0)
N=1  18  N=19
Single  -T  yC  -T  -C
difference  ~AYt  AYt  AY,  AYt 
difference  13.3  29.3  -151.7  54.6
(9.2)  (20.9)  (22.8)  (23.0)
Double  - T  -C  -T  -C
difference  [AYAY)D 2 =]  [A(Y  - 2)ID 2 = 0] 
-16.0  -206.3
(22.1)  (34.3)




Leavers round 3 (Dj3 =0)
Participants round 2 (Di2 =  1)  Non-participants round 2 (Di2 =  0)
N=292  N=  424
Single  _T  -C  -T  -C
AYt  AYt  AY,  AYt 
difference  -3.2  -4.8  -142.1  4.2
(4.8)  (11.2)  (6.2)  (7.6)
Double  [A(Y'  - Y-)TD,2 =1]=  [A(Y2  -Y  )jD,2 =0]=
difference  2Y  DO=1i  =0
1.6  -146.3
(11I.7)  (i l1.9)
difference  [(Y2 T
- Y2 )ID2 =1]  - [A(Y-  Y2 )jD 2 =0]=
147.9
(17.3)





Note: Standard  errors in parentheses.  Under  the joint null of 'no lagged  gains from  past participation'  and
'no selection  bias', the triple  differences  should  be the same  (see  equation  (7))Figure  1: Log of odds ratio - matching  first wave
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